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What are the Courts Saying to Auditors? 
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 
Calfee, Halter, Calfee, Griswold & Sommer, Attorneys at Law 
The acquaintance of accountants with courts is not a new phenomenon. 
In 1954 Saul Levy, in Accountants' Legal Responsibility,1 said that in England 
cases involving accountants had been quite numerous and went back more than 
sixty years. These early cases were really part of two developments. First, they 
were part of the development of English common law concerning liability which 
might attach to spoken or written statements if they were negligently made: 
Was there an action? If so who might maintain it? What were its elements? 
Second, they were part of the development of English corporation law embodied 
largely in the English Companies Acts which progressively created stricter stand-
ards of responsibility for officers and directors of English corporations, and for 
their auditors as well. 
Common Law Developments 
Most of the earlier cases in England and in the United States arose in 
common law situations, i.e. they did not arise out of statutorily created duties. 
The cases presented a wide variety of situations in which auditors were charged 
either with falsification or recklessness or simply negligence and the courts were 
largely concerned with relating the kind and degree of fault to the situations of 
those who might have a recovery because of the fault. 
In this country Ultramares v. Touche,2 decided in 1931 by the New York 
Court of Appeals (the highest court in New York state), fairly definitively marked 
off the limits of accountants' liability under common law in this country for a 
generation. In that case, the New York court, speaking through Judge (later 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court) Benjamin Cardozo, articulated 
these principles: 
1. Fraudulent conduct, or conduct so reckless as to be tantamount to fraud, 
created liability not only to the accountant's client but to third parties as well 
who were injured as a consequence. 
2. Negligent conduct may create liability to the client because of "privity," 
but there would be liability to third parties only if the preparation and transmis-
sion of the financial statement and opinion were the "end and aim of the transac-
tion." Thus if a client engaged an auditor to prepare audited financial statements 
for the express and understood purpose of giving them to a specific bank, the 
bank might have a claim if the auditor were negligent. Other cases elaborated 
this to encompass members of a circumscribed class of persons; thus if the auditor 
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understood the client intended to seek bank financing, then any bank from which 
such financing was sought might have a claim based on negligence. But the 
use of the statements to secure the financing still had to be "the end and aim of 
the transaction" between the auditor and his client. 
Statutory Law—The Securities Acts 
These principles remained relatively intact into the 60's (and for that matter 
in many states are still apparently "good" law: recent litigation in Florida has 
expressly followed the Ultramares case). The most significant extension of po-
tential liability for accountants occurred in the United States Congress when it 
adopted the Securities Act of 1933. Under this statute accountants (included in 
the broader word "experts" used in the Act) might have liability with respect 
to the contents of financial statements used in registration statements with their 
consent unless they could show as a matter of defense they had ". . . after rea-
sonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time 
such [expertised] part of the registration statement became effective, that the 
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material 
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not 
misleading..." (Section 11). 
It is difficult now, almost four decades later, to understand the impact this 
enactment had not only upon auditors, but the underwriting and business com-
munity in general. The Investment Bankers Association predicted that ". . . its 
practical results . . . will be to suspend the underwriting or distribution of many 
capital issues by responsible persons . . . ." 3 
For the first time issuers might be held liable for misstatements in a registra-
tion statement (part of which constituted the prospectus required to be given 
to purchasers and in many instances offerees of registered securities), regardless 
of conventional notions such as privity, due care, reliance, causality and the like. 
The burden and danger thrust upon others beside the issuer—its directors, certain 
officers, "experts" (including accountants), underwriters—was slightly less bur-
densome, but nonetheless a significant departure from common law standards for 
liability. An accountant might be liable to the purchaser of the registered security 
even if the purchaser had not relied in the slightest on the auditor's opinion and 
did not in fact even know of the opinion. The liability flowed simply from a 
material omission or misstatement in the audited statements, unless the accountant 
could show reasonable investigation and that he had reasonable ground to believe 
there was no misstatement or omission. 
This departure from earlier law, virtually all of which in this country had 
been judge-made, alarmed many leaders of the profession not the least of whom 
was the venerated George O. May, who said grimly, 
I cannot believe that a law is just or can long be maintained in effect 
which deliberately contemplates the possibility that a purchaser may re-
cover from a person from whom he has not bought, in respect of a state-
ment which at the time of his purchase he had not read, contained in a 
document which he did not then know to exist, a sum which is not 
measured by injury resulting from falsity in such statement.4 
Despite the misgivings of Mr. May and others, the implications of the 
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Securities Act of 1933 were never explored judicially to any significant extent 
until 1968 when the United States District Court in New York rendered its 
opinion in Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation5 which is discussed 
hereafter. 
In 1934 the Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which 
provided, among other things, for the filing of registration statements and periodic 
reports by listed companies including certified financial statements. Again the 
statute contained provisions for liability that could be asserted against auditors, 
but in many particulars these perils were less frightening; very little litigation 
has been prosecuted successfully against anyone under Section 18 of the 1934 Act, 
but this is no assurance that it may not be the source of such in the future. 
Effect of the Securities Acts 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, of 
course, did not repeal in any way previous common law holdings, such as the 
Ultramares case. Previous litigation had been largely in state courts and gen-
erally it was state substantive law that was determinative of liability.6 Thus the 
enactment of these federal measures did not explicitly broaden the scope of 
accountants' liabilities except when they consented to the use of their opinions 
in registration statements under the 1933 Act or in filings under the 1934 Act. 
With regard to the ordinary run of mine matters the liability of auditors still 
depended upon state law with its then fairly narrowly drawn concepts. 
A process, an event plus a process, and broader cultural and political move-
ments have combined to change this. 
The process is the subtle interaction of statutory law and judge-made law. 
This has been expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and James M . 
Landis, once dean of Harvard Law School. 
Justice Holmes wrote, 
[I]t seems to me that courts in dealing with statutes have been too slow 
to recognize that statutes even when in terms covering only particular 
cases may imply a policy different from that of the common law, and 
therefore may exclude a reference to the common law for the purpose 
of limiting their scope. 
And Landis, in the same vein, stated: 
. . . much of what is ordinarily regarded as "common" law finds its 
source in legislative enactment.7 
Thus statutory notions, literally unconcerned with more than a narrow band 
of common law, leak through the edges into other domains. As will be clear 
shortly, this has been a significant factor in the expansion of liability dangers 
for the accounting profession. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission Enacts Rule 10b-5 
Assisting in strenuous fashion this development has been the event plus a 
process. The event was the adoption by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942 of Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act. This rule was quickly adopted by 
the Commission pursuant to a broad rule-making power under the 1934 Act 
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for the purpose of curing a peculiar hiatus in the scheme of federal securities 
regulation that provided a fulsome system of penalties for the fraudulent seller 
of securities, but was completely silent as far as fraudulent purchasers were 
concerned. 
The terms of Rule 10b-5 are extremely broad: 
Rule 10b-5 
Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, 
or of any facility of a national securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Notably absent in this Rule are many of the particularizations contained in 
the 1933 Act defining the conditions of liability; particularly absent is any state-
ment of a defense being available if there is a showing of reasonable investigation 
and reasonable belief. There is no specification of those to whom liability may 
run, there is no measure of damages, there is no limitation upon those who may 
be held responsible: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . . " 
Rule 10b-5 was intended purely as an enforcement tool for the Commission.8 
In 1946 an imaginative plaintiff's counsel and a creative court combined to yield 
the conclusion that Rule 10b-5 was not only available to the Commission for en-
forcement purposes but was available to private claimants as well who could 
establish they had been harmed by a violation of the Rule.9 Thus was opened 
the floodgate through which oceans of litigation have passed in the intervening 
twenty-six years, virtually to the point that other more explicit liability-creating 
provisions of the federal securities laws have been vastly overshadowed as litigants 
sought the benefits of Rule 10b-5. 
Causes of Recent Litigation 
But these somewhat technical legal developments are not sufficient to explain 
the explosion of litigation that has confronted accountants during the past ten 
years. Broad social developments have been the soil in which these seeds have 
become rooted and have yielded often bitter fruit. 
First, there has been the emergence of the consumer, so dramatic that it has 
been suggested we are entering upon the "age of the consumer." The whys of 
the broad phenomenon are too complex to narrate here, but it is clear that rest-
lessness with the impersonality of technology, political necessities, the emergence 
of a new brand of populism (Naderism is one form of it), have combined with 
legal resourcefulness to bring about an equalizing of the position before the law 
of the consumer and commercial interests (or perhaps a disequilibrium in favor 
of the consumer). The courts have joined with legislatures to expand the litiga-
tion potential of the class suit and develop other means of redress for wrongs 
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which, while existing in the past, because of inertia or legal technicalities were 
never susceptible of effective redress. Legislatures, state and federal, have tripped 
over each other providing protection for consumers. 
Much of this, of course, has familiar ring to those familiar with the de-
velopment of federal securities law. Most of the devices now urged for consumer 
protection have their counterparts in this structure dating back decades: disclosure 
("Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking 
Is Dangerous to Your Health" parallels the scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts 
[as well as parts of other SEC-administered statutes]); regulation (the require-
ment that more and more products must be approved by federal authority before 
they can be sold to the public sounds surprisingly similar to the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 governing mutual funds); licensing of purveyors (the 
requirement of federal licensing in many areas parallels the provisions of the 
1934 Act requiring the licensing of broker-dealers). 
As people have become alert to the possibility of redress in their many roles 
as consumers, the potentials of the federal scheme of securities regulation have 
been explored and used. 
Consequences of Professional Stature 
Also the accounting profession itself has become even more pronouncedly 
a profession. Levy in 1954 could write, "When speaking of public accountancy 
as a learned profession it must be realized that in this country, at any rate, it is 
a relatively new profession . . . ." 1 0 If question there ever was, surely it is beyond 
cavil that accounting is now a highly developed profession which has gone 
through many travails in recent years to develop principles of conduct and 
principles governing the quality of its work. As this has happened, it has not 
escaped the notice of those of the public who feel they have suffered harm as a 
consequence of shortcomings of the profession, either as a whole in failing to 
establish sufficiently high standards or because of individual members who have 
failed even to reach those which have been articulated. The possibility of this 
was foreseen: 
Thus as the legal liabilities of professional accountants in the United 
States have seemed to be extended by court decisions and legislation, 
the [American] Institute [of Certified Public Accountants] has become 
increasingly aware that pronouncements and rules which encourage 
higher standards of performance might be used against its members 
unfairly in the courts.11 
Other circumstances could be recounted which have led to the proliferation 
of litigation against accountants: the dynamics of the economy, with the 
multiplication of mergers and complicated financial transactions involving pub-
licly held companies; more and more imaginative use of accounting principles 
to achieve financial magic (e.g. the pooling concept); the participation of vast 
numbers in the market (31 million shareholders plus millions more who partici-
pate indirectly through mutual funds, pension and profit sharing trusts and other 
pooling devices); the development of more exacting standards of disclosure and 
the vastly increased importance of information in the investment process. 
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The Voice of Litigated Cases 
In our way of doing things often the situations created by social and economic 
forces are not resolved in a systematic fashion aimed to embrace in a broad, ex-
pansive manner the full range of the problem, as is sought to be done through 
such legislation as the Uniform Commercial Code, or in a different milieu, the 
civil codes that characterize continental legal systems. Rather it is the genius, 
and often the frustration, of our system that emerging broad-scale problems are 
dealt with through the medium of litigating particular fact situations and through 
this process, accompanied by skilled (and sometimes not so skilled) interpretation, 
the law is moved along. Thus no single case resolves more than the litigation 
confronting the court; no single case purports to codify an area of human conduct. 
But cases, analyzed one with the other, can often provide clues for solving other 
controversies and can be used to shape standards of conduct, lay and professional, 
to avoid future legal liability. 
What the courts are saying to auditors, then, is not an integrated set of 
precepts; they are not weaving a properly proportioned whole. They are simply 
deciding cases and in the process they are using established legal principles, they 
are modifying others, they are bringing to the surface principles that may long 
have been latent, they are producing results in particular litigation which they 
conceive to be the just, rational result—in that case. 
Five cases have been the most noted in this present period of development: 
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, noted earlier; Fischer v. Kletz;12 
U.S. v. Simon;13 Drake v. Thor Power Company;14 SEC v. Bangor Punta Cor-
poration.15 Of less direct significance, but nonetheless an important part of this 
pattern, is the case of Gamble v. Gerstle-Skogmo, Inc.16 
BarChris Construction Corporation 
The first of these (though not first in time), and in some respects the least 
singular, was the Escott case. In this case purchasers of convertible debentures 
of BarChris Construction Corporation sued the corporation (which was bankrupt 
at the time of suit), the directors, certain officers, the underwriters and the 
auditors because of alleged misstatements and omissions in the registration state-
ment for the debentures. Al l of the defendants were found liable under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, the provision governing liabilities arising out of 
registration statements. The auditors were found wanting in two areas: first, 
it was found that there were errors in the audited statements on which they 
opined and that they had not exercised due care; and second, it was found that 
they had failed to exercise due diligence in conducting the "S-1 review" covering 
developments between the audit date and the effective date of the registration 
statement. 
The case is less noteworthy for the enunciation or development of legal 
principles than it is because it was the first systematic treatment of the responsi-
bilities of auditors under the 1933 Act (an earlier case, Shonts v. Hirliman,17 the 
only previous case dealing with the responsibilities of auditors under the 1933 
Act, was almost universally believed to have been wrongly decided). The court 
did however state some significant points. It found that the standards for the 
S-1 review contained in Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33 adopted by 
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the AICPA were sufficient in outlining procedures for satisfying the due diligence 
standard and it further found that the standards established by the firm internally 
were compliant with SAP No. 33. The fault of the auditors, said the court, was 
in failing to comply with their own established standards. 
There is some reason to believe that the court was, at least in some par-
ticulars, unduly harsh on the auditors and perhaps held them to higher standards 
than it should have.18 
However, the case did remind auditors of the perils latent in Section 11 and 
undoubtedly led to stricter standards among them. 
Yale Express 
The second case of significance was Fischer v. Kletz. In this case auditors 
for Yale Express Systems, Inc. during the course of making some special studies 
for the client unrelated to their auditing function discovered that the statements 
which they had certified contained material errors. The court found fault with 
their failure to make this known other than to management when it came to 
their attention; rather they allowed the statements to continue unquestioned for 
a considerable time while those making transactions in the securities of Yale 
Express in the marketplace presumably relied upon them. The court found this 
a violation of common law principles, basing its opinion largely upon the Re-
statement of Torts, which is an authoritative effort to systematize and clarify 
common law tort principles, and left open the possibility of a violation of Rule 
10b-5. The duty found by the court to make this disclosure has been codified 
in Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 41. 
Continental Vending 
The case that rocked the accounting profession far more than any of the 
others discussed herein, and with good reason, and the one that may in the long 
run do most to adjust accounting standards and practices was U.S. v. Simon. 
In this case two partners and an associate of a national firm of auditors were 
indicted for alleged violation of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The charge was that a footnote in the financial statements 
of Continental Vending Machine Corporation for the year ended September 30, 
1962, was materially misleading and suffered from material omissions, and that 
this was the result of knowing conduct by the defendants. After a first trial 
ended in a hung jury, a second trial brought their conviction. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a unanimous opinion written 
by Judge Henry J. Friendly, one of the most knowledgeable federal judges in 
financial, securities and accounting matters, affirmed the convictions. 
It is clear from reading the charge of the trial judge to the jury, a charge 
which in affirming the Court of Appeals confirmed as a correct statement of the 
law, and from reading the Court of Appeals opinion, that the courts thrust com-
pliance with generally accepted accounting principles into a position subsidiary 
to fair presentation. In effect, the courts said that not only must financial state-
ments be prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, 
they must also "fairly present" the financial condition of the company and what-
ever else they purport to present. In the lower court's words, 
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A firm of public accountants . . . engaged to perform an independent 
audit, represents that it will perform the audit in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards and accounting principles and 
that it will render an opinion, based on its audit, as to whether the 
financial statement of the company fairly presents its financial position 
and the results of its operations. 
Proof that a defendant, in conducting the 1962 audit, departed from 
such auditing standards, or participated in the preparation or approval 
of a financial statement that did not fairly present Continental's financial 
position, results of its 1962 operations in accordance with generally ac-
cepted auditing standards and accounting principles, is evidence, not 
necessarily conclusive, that the defendant did not act honestly and in 
good faith, and that statements contrary to such standards and principles 
may have been materially false or misleading. On the other hand, proof 
that the defendant did act in accordance with such generally accepted 
auditing standards and accounting principles is evidence which may be 
very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith, 
and that the facts as certified were not materially false or misleading. 
* * * * * 
So the auditor's responsibility in accordance with his engagement 
is, first, to render an opinion that must satisfy the auditor that the state-
ment fairly presents the results of the operations about the financial 
position of the client; and, second, to be satisfied that the statement con-
tains no misstatements of fact, or, at least, no misstatement of facts 
known to the auditor. 
The critical test, therefore, is whether the financial statement here, 
as a whole, fairly presented the financial condition of Continental as of 
September 30, 1962, and whether it accurately reported the operations 
for fiscal 1962. (emphasis supplied) 
At the Seaview Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Financial Reporting held 
in the latter part of 1971, it was clear that this notion of the primacy of fairness 
over generally accepted accounting principles is less than unanimously acceptable 
to accountants.19 This is understandable. Most accountants probably feel more 
comfortable dealing with the principles that have been warp and woof of their 
educational and professional experience than they do in placing their professional 
reputations (not to mention their finances) at the mercy of determining com-
pliance with a vaguely defined standard that is more ethical than legal or financial. 
And yet this notion is not radical. It has been suggested in the past. In the 
Associated Gas and Electric Company case decided by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in 1942, the Commission, after an extraordinarily detailed 
examination of alleged accounting improprieties in the accounts of Associated 
Gas and Electric, shifted to what it considered more basic considerations and said: 
We think, however, that too much attention to the question whether the 
financial statements formally complied with principles, practice and con-
ventions accepted at the time should not be permitted to blind us to the 
basic question whether the financial statements performed the function 
of enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence. Each of the 
accountants' certificates in question contained the opinion that, subject 
to various qualifications therein, the financial statements fairly presented 
the financial condition of the registrant, in accordance with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. If that basic representation was not ac-
30 
curate as to the financial statements as a whole, no weight of precedent 
or practice with respect to the minutiae of the statements could justify 
the accountants' certificates... . For the average investor [read layman?] 
the financial statements of this system contain not a hint of the rot 
hidden beneath the surface of this holding company system. 
We believe that, in addition to the question whether the individual 
items of financial statements are stated in accordance with accounting 
principles, practices and conventions, there must be considered the further 
question whether, on an overall basis, the statements are informative.20 
Liability to Third Parties 
Beginning in 1951 the carefully delineated common law restraints on the 
imposition of liability to third parties on auditors laid out in the Ultramares 
case began to erode. In a long, rather brilliant, dissenting opinion, Lord Justice 
Denning in Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.21 laid out what he conceived 
should be the broad principles of liability to third parties for negligence in these 
words: 
[To] whom do these professional people owe a duty? They [ac-
countants] owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and 
also I think to any third person to whom they themselves show the 
accounts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show the 
accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other action 
on them . . . . In my opinion accountants owe a duty of care not only 
to their own clients, but also to all those whom they \now will rely on 
their accounts in the transactions for which these accounts are prepared. 
(emphasis supplied) 
Thirteen years later this viewpoint became the law of England in Hedley, 
Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.22 Four years later a sizable dent 
was made in the earlier doctrine in this country in Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin.23 
The Court there peered into the same pit of danger that had caused Justice 
Cardozo to recoil from finding liability to third parties for simple negligence 
and said: 
The wisdom of the decision in Ultramares has been doubted . . . and 
this Court shares the doubt. Why should an innocent reliant party be 
forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant's professional mis-
conduct? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and spread by 
imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of 
insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the 
cost onto the entire consuming public? 
The Court then added this pregnant thought: 
Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary tech-
niques of the accounting profession? 
Paralleling this expansion of liability under common law has been the de-
velopment under Rule 10b-5. In Drake v. Thor Power Company, the federal 
district court in Chicago determined that auditors could be liable under Rule 
10b-5 if they were negligent in giving their opinion. 
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These cases, of course, create significant dangers for auditors. If simple 
negligence is sufficient to establish monetary liability, and that liability runs to 
all those whose reliance "can be actually foreseen," isn't the door opened for 
appalling damages? An error in the audit of General Motors or American Tele-
phone & Telegraph or any other substantial publicly held company might result 
in catastrophic consequences. The hovering hope that such a burden may not 
be inflicted on auditors is the fact that it is not yet clear whether negligence can 
create monetary liability for a Rule 10b-5 offender who did not participate in 
the purchase or sale of securities. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,24 a case in 
which one of the charges was that the company had put out a misleading press 
release as a consequence of negligence, Judge Friendly said in his concurring 
opinion: 
The consequences of holding that negligence in the drafting of a press 
release . . . may impose civil liability on the corporations are frightening. 
Despite this uncertainty, however, it is reported that accounting firms or 
their insurance carriers have paid several millions of dollars in settling claims 
that appear to have been based upon negligence.25 
Responsibility for Adequate Disclosure 
Two other cases are of importance in analyzing the developing responsi-
bilities of accountants, though neither of them involved accountants as defendants. 
In the first, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the District Court determined 
that a proxy statement used in soliciting approval of a merger of General Out-
door Advertising Co. with Gamble-Skogmo was misleading. The financial state-
ments of General carried certain fixed assets of the company in accordance with 
customary accounting principles: historical cost less depreciation. However, the 
court stated, without suggesting that the financial statements were incorrect, that 
in addition to that information there should have been disclosed additional in-
formation indicating a market value higher than book since there was significant 
evidence of the intention of Gamble-Skogmo after the merger to dispose of the 
assets by sale, there had been a number of sales of similar assets at prices sub-
stantially above book, and the company had received offers and appraisals for 
the remaining ones that indicated market value higher than book. 
In the next case, SEC v. Bangor Punta Corporation, the court went further 
and indicated that in the somewhat special circumstances of that case a significant 
asset, the stock of the Bangor and Aroostock Railroad, should have been written 
down on Bangor Punta's balance sheet because of indications that its value had 
become less than the carrying value. In that case, for somewhat obscure reasons, 
Bangor Punta had put the railroad on its books at $18.4 million, an amount 
based upon an appraisal; this treatment had been allowed earlier by the SEC. 
The court determined that, given the status of negotiations looking toward the 
possible sale of the stock of the railroad, it should have been written down to 
about $5 million, the amount which was being discussed with a potential buyer. 
The court remarked that its requirement of this write-down might not be re-
quired in ". . . cases where book carrying figures are in accordance with principles 
of conventional transactional accounting or where circumstances might be 
different." 
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Both of these cases, admittedly each posing somewhat unique problems, 
suggest that permissible accounting treatment may not be sufficiently reflective 
of economic reality to stand alone: either additional information must be dis-
closed or the financial statements must be modified to make fuller disclosure. 
Conclusions 
In the light of all the above, what are the courts saying to auditors? 
Obviously, the courts do not speak with a single voice, and they speak al-
ways in the context of the particular cases before them. There are, however, some 
conclusions that are suggested by this discussion. 
First, the performance of the accounting profession is going to be increasingly 
subject to judicial scrutiny. As the task of bringing class suits has been moderated, 
and as potential plaintiffs and their counsel have witnessed the ease with which 
judicial intervention may be secured, accountants increasingly may expect to have 
their work thrust into the judicial arena either by private litigants or the SEC. 
Second, for the most part the courts are willing to let the profession articulate 
accounting principles and auditing standards, but they are inclined to look beyond 
conformity to accounting principles for answers to what they consider a more 
basic concern: do the financial statements fairly and meaningfully inform the 
investor? If they do that, the court would probably be disinclined to fault heavily 
an auditor who may have erred in the application of accounting principles; if 
they don't, as is evident from the Simon case the court will not be deterred from 
penalizing the auditor because of heavy evidence of conformity with the principles. 
Third, while the courts and the SEC do not appear to be insisting that 
financial statements must be reduced to kindergarten simplicity, still they do ap-
pear to be insisting that they have intelligibility to the layman. In 1947 the 
Commission stated: 
It is not enough to say that here perhaps much . . . of the factual back-
ground was given in footnote data. . . . [E]ven if [all significant data] 
had been given there is an additional obligation to present the material 
in a way in which it will be useful to the informed but less sophisticated 
readers. (emphasis supplied) 
And a Federal District Court said: 
The purpose of the financial statements is to inform the man on the 
street, and the underlying policy of the Securities and Exchange Acts 
and of Rule 10b-5 is to assure that he can have truthful information in 
buying securities, regardless of the intended victim of the fraud. More-
over, the defendants have set themselves up to be independent certified 
public auditors. As such, they have assumed a peculiar relation with the 
investing public. As accountants, the defendant clearly cannot be im-
munized from suit. (emphasis supplied) 
It is not enough to prepare financial statements in a manner that would 
permit intelligent interpretation only by the trained accountant or the invest-
ment banker. Above everything else, they are demanding that the statements 
disclose and that this disclosure be intelligible and helpful to more than a handful 
in understanding the financial condition and the operations of the company. 
Fourth, when the profession has established standards, the courts will rely 
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heavily upon the extent to which the professional work conforms to those stand-
ards. This is not to say, however, that if a court found a standard or principle 
lacking it would not fall back on the notion found in the McKesson & Robbins 
case of the thirties decided by the SEC to the effect that the entire profession had 
been insufficiently cautious.26 
With the courts more heavily involved in monitoring the way in which ac-
countants do their work, the pressure on the profession to find means of fore-
stalling further disaster is heavy. Certainly to some extent the increased urgency 
of the effort to define accounting principles and eliminate alternatives is a fruit 
of this judicial scrutiny. Too, surely in some measure the in-depth efforts being 
made by the Wheat and Trueblood groups were undertaken in hopes that a more 
effective means of establishing accounting principles and a better definition of 
the objectives of financial statements might allay some of the hazards. 
It is sometimes said that the courts are "hostile" to the accounting profession. 
This is a doubtful proposition. The courts are concerned, as are the SEC and 
state securities authorities, as well as the self-regulatory agencies, with the main-
tenance of fairness and honesty in the securities markets. Crucial to that task is 
disclosure. And central to disclosure is financial information. As long as this is 
so the courts will scrutinize with care how those who purport to give that 
financial information a higher degree of credibility perform their role. 
After all, the accounting profession came into existence to provide to various 
parts of society assurances that could not be secured by relying upon the unverified 
assertions of preparers of financial statements. The profession had its inception 
in the notion that accountants, as members of a learned profession, would exercise 
independence, would not prostitute their skills for the venal purposes of their 
employers, would be answerable to those who employed them and those to whom 
they addressed their conclusions at the behest of those who employed them. 
In the earliest days of the profession their efforts were designed to assure honesty 
among owners in an enterprise, credibility to the owners' or managers' assertions 
to existing or potential creditors. In these roles those who relied upon them 
were very limited in number and generally the risks, though large for the time, 
were nothing as compared with those involved in present-day financial transac-
tions. The role of auditor is essentially the same. The audience, however, is 
larger and the stakes are higher. 
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